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GORDON R. CHRISTENSEN, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ASKING THE JURORS' QUESTIONS 
COMPOUNDS THE ERROR OF HIS BIAS 
AND REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
In the responsive brief, the government contends that the trial court's conduct in 
cross-examining Mr. Christensen was proper, because he was merely conveying the 
jury's questions, as he did throughout the trial. See Brief of Appellee at 4, 7-12, relying 
on State v. Anderson. 158 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1945); and State v. Martinez. 326 P.2d 
102,103 (Utah 1958). 
Contrary to the government's repeated assertions that counsel for Christensen mis-
characterized the fact that the judge was asking the jurors' questions, e.g., Brief of 
Appellee at 7, Christensen's opening brief accurately indicated that the trial court asked 
the jurors if they had any questions, and then proceeded to cross-examine Mr. 
Christensen. See, Opening Brief of Appellant at 17-18. 
The fact that the trial court was conveying the jurors' questions does not mollify, 
but compounds, the error in his questioning of Christensen. This is confirmed by 
reference to the Anderson and Martinez cases relied on by the government, and by 
reference to a more recent case, State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989). 
In State v. Anderson, 158 P.2d 127 (Utah 1945), the court discouraged trial courts 
from permitting jurors to ask questions, and cautioned that courts should generally only 
permit such questions when a juror asks for additional information, and when the juror's 
question will aid the juror in understanding a material issue. Id. at 128-29. The court 
cautioned that jurors should not be permitted to take the case out of the hands of counsel, 
or to disrupt the orderly course of proceedings. Id. at 128. The court recognized that 
prejudicial error occurs if a trial court permits juror questions which are improper and 
defeat the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 128-29. 
In State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958), the court reversed a rape 
conviction because the trial court not only permitted, but encouraged the jurors to 
question witnesses during the trial, and to call and question after deliberations had begun 
a witness who was not called by either party. Id. at 389. 
In reversing, the Martinez court referred back to the Anderson and acknowledged 
that that decision granted trial courts discretion to convey "unsolicited" questions of 
jurors, but reiterated that such practice should occur only in rare cases. Id. at 103-04 and 
n.3. The court quoted with apparent approval a concurring opinion of two of the 
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Anderson justices, which stated, 
[Wjhile it is proper to permit the juror to ask questions of a witness to 
clarify some matter in the mind of the juror, the court should never on its 
own motion invite the jury to question witnesses, and should at all times 
guard carefully the rights of the parties in permitting the witness to answer 
questions asked by a juror. 
Martinez, 326 P.2d at 103-04. 
The Martinez court noted one of the problems caused by juror questioning - that 
lawyers are loathe to object to improper juror questioning for fear of offending the final 
decision makers. Id. at 103. 
More recently, in State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the court 
addressed the federal aspects of the defendant's claim that juror questioning during the 
trial evinced premature deliberation, in derogation of his state and federal constitutional 
rights to a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 1144-45 and n.34. The court noted that 
premature deliberation by jurors causes two problems: 1) jurors may assess the evidence 
without the benefit of the final legal instructions and 2) jurors may become entrenched in 
their opinions before hearing all the evidence. Id. at 1145. The court again recognized 
that permitting juror questioning is not encouraged, but found that the questions asked in 
that case did not demonstrate problems associated with premature deliberation, and were 
proper to clarify issues for the jurors in that case. Id. at 1145. 
From this line of cases, this Court can first determine that the trial court had no 
business routinely soliciting questions from the jurors, and that the government is thus in 
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error in touting this consistent conduct as proper. See Brief of Appellee at 10 (noting the 
trial court's soliciting juror questions for all of the witnesses in this case, and claiming 
that the fact that he was consistent in doing this disproves bias). 
By reviewing the transcript of the trial in this case, this Court can readily confirm 
that the trial court did not merely convey proper clarifying questions from the jurors, but 
asked several unnecessary and improper questions, and also made two key factual 
assertions that were inaccurate, and thus very damaging to Christensen's legitimate 
defense. 
The first question, asking why Christensen did not take the breath test if he was 
not intoxicated (T. 216), was one that had been asked and answered repeatedly 
throughout the trial. On direct examination, Christensen testified that when the officer 
asked him to take a breath test, he told the officer that he had already told him he was not 
taking any more tests, that he would not take that test, that he would take his chances on 
losing his driver's license, and that he would rather go to jail than take any more tests (T. 
165-66, 168, 171). 
On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Christensen testified that the officer 
asked him to take the breathalyzer, but that this was after they had become "somewhat at 
arm's length." (T. 203). He testified that upon receiving the warning about 
consequences with his license, he said he was not taking the test, and would take his 
chances with the Driver License Division (T. 203). He testified that he believed the 
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officer conducting the DUI investigation was biased and insisted the Christensen was 
drunk, and that he did not know if the breath test results would be biased (T. 204). He 
then testified that he knew the test would given an objective printout of his alcohol level, 
but maintained that he did not think that would clear things up, given his attitude toward 
the officer conducting the overall investigation (T. 211). He conceded that the test result 
would probably be fair and impartial, but still would not take the test (T. 213). On 
redirect, he testified that at the time of the DUI investigation, it did not occur to him to 
assess the capabilities of the breath testing machine (T. 215). 
Having the court follow up with the question of why he would not take the test if 
he knew he was innocent was not necessary clarification, but was pointed and redundant 
prosecutorial questioning by the judge. The fact that the trial court solicited the 
questions from the jurors was improper under Anderson, Martinez, and Johnson, and the 
fact that he asked them when they were not necessary was improper under Anderson, 
Martinez, and Johnson. Particularly when viewed in light of the other questions the 
judge asked, the questions demonstrate a lack of judicial impartiality. 
After the discussion about Christensen's failure to take the breath test, the trial 
court first reiterated Mr. Christensen's claim that he suffered from low blood sugar (T. 
216 lines 5-7), and then stated, "Usually diabetes means high blood sugar." (T. 216 lines 
10 and 11). The court then challenged, "Eating sweets would increase your blood sugar 
level." (T. 216 lines 11-12). He then asked Christensen, "Is that your understanding?" 
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(T. 216 line 12). 
The trial court's factual assertions that diabetes means high blood sugar, and that 
eating sweets would increase blood sugar, were not questions, but were a key factual 
predicates to the challenge to Christensen's testimony, that he was eating sweets to 
counteract the effects of diabetes prior to the traffic stop. 
Regardless of whether the factual assertions originated from a juror or the trial 
court himself, because the assertions conveyed key facts that were not in evidence, were 
not in fact true,1 and were disastrously inconsistent with Mr. Christensen's defense that 
his incoherent and clumsy behavior was caused by diabetic hypoglycemia, rather than 
alcohol intoxication, the trial court should not have conveyed the assertions and related 
question, regardless of their source. See, e.g., Martinez, supra. 
The questions about Christensen's blood sugar level at the time of trial and about 
normal blood sugar levels (T. 216) did not clarify any material point in the trial. But see, 
e.g., Martinez. 
The next question as to why Christensen did not call his wife to testify in support 
of his hypoglycemia defense (T. 216), was clearly inconsistent with fundamental precepts 
of criminal law recognizing that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent, that the 
1See, e.g., American Diabetes Association Homepage, 
http://www.diabetes.org/for-parents-and-kids/diabetes-care/tiypoglycemia.jsp 
(confirming that diabetics often suffer from hypoglycemia, which may be caused by lack 
of food, and that drinking juice and eating high sugar foods is in fact the recommended 
course of treatment to alleviate the symptoms of diabetic hypoglycemia. 
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government has the burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a 
defendant has no burden to call witnesses or do anything else to prove his innocence. 
See, generally, e.g.. State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841 (discussing the 
presumption of innocence and government's burden in the context of a challenge to a 
jury instruction on reasonable doubt). 
The entire line of questioning evinces premature deliberation by the jury, and the 
fact that the trial court condoned the questions and assertions by propounding them in 
court confirms the highly prejudicial nature of the proceedings in this case. 
While Mr. Christensen was clearly impaired on the night of his arrest, the 
evidence of the source of that impairment, whether it was alcohol intoxication or diabetic 
hypoglycemia, was very much in dispute. See Opening Brief of Appellant, Statement of 
Facts, at pages 4-19. 
The entire line of questioning and assertions propounded by the judge right before 
deliberations was grossly improper and exhibited a judicial bias that undermines Mr. 
Christensen's verdicts and appearance of fairness in our judicial system. See Opening 
Brief at 19-31. 
Because the fact that the judge solicited the improper questions he asked from the 
jurors compounds the error, this Court should hold that the questions constituted 
reversible error. See, Martinez, Anderson, and Johnson, supra. 
Conclusion 
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This Court should reverse Mr. Christensen's convictions and remand this matter to 
the trial court for retrial before an impartial judge. 
Dated this /7*day of/%"*^ . 2004. 
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